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Oggetto: Richiesta congedo per motivi di studio – artt. 17 e 18 del D.P.R. 382/1980

Il sottoscritto prof. Pietro Navarra, nato a Messina il 30 agosto 1968, ordinario di Scienza delle Finanze (SECS-P/03) e titolare dei corsi di “Economia del settore pubblico” nel corso di laurea triennale in Economia, banca e finanza (secondo semestre), di “Economia Pubblica” nel corso di laurea triennale Consulente del lavoro e scienze dei servizi giuridici (primo semestre) e “Analisi delle politiche pubbliche – Il modulo” nel corso di laurea magistrale Consulenza e gestione d’impresa (secondo semestre) afferenti al Dipartimento di economia e di “Scienza delle finanze” nel corso di laurea in Scienze politiche amministrazione e servizi (mutuato con “Economia del settore pubblico”) afferente al Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Giuridiche

CHIEDE

Per il periodo dal 1 marzo 2024 al 31 luglio 2024 un periodo di 5 mesi di congedo per motivi di studio di cui all’art. 17 del D.P.R. 382/1980 per dedicarsi ad attività didattica e di ricerca presso le università King’s College di Londra (Regno Unito) e Temple University di Filadelfia (Stati Uniti).

Il sottoscritto si impegna a comunicare alla SV e al Consiglio di Dipartimento di Economia i risultati della ricerca con le modalità di cui agli art. 18 del D.P.R. 382/1980. Inoltre, dichiara di non avere compiuto il trentacinquesimo anno di anzianità di servizio e di non avere usufruito negli ultimi 10 anni di altro congedo al medesimo titolo.

Di seguito il titolo e il piano di studio della ricerca.

The Politics of Economic Growth

The hidden nexus between political and economic change

Abstract. The aim of the book is to extend the path-breaking work by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (AR henceforth) on the causes of economic growth. In their extensive studies they develop a theory pointing out that the difference between rich and poor nations is due to man-made political and



economic institutions. More specifically, economic success (or the lack of it) is determined by the politics that created different institutional routes conducive to alternative development paths. AR assembled astonishing historical evidence since the Roman Empire and the Mayan city-states to offer empirical support to their theoretical predictions. In this book our aim is to validate AR's theory with current data using information about 160 countries over a time span that goes from 1980 to 2010. In the first part of the book we construct an empirical growth model that incorporates AR's perspective and design accordingly an appropriate econometric framework to test the predictions of their theory. We then empirically assess how the political calculus of incumbent rulers affects the implementation of those policy choices that are likely to lead to economic growth. In the second part of the book we examine whether AR's theory can be also used to explain other transmission channels that are expected to be conducive to economic progress: the attraction of foreign direct investments, the spur of entrepreneurship and the empowerment of individuals through the investment in human capital.

Outline of the book and list of contents

Chp 1: Introduction

In Chapter 1 we present the research question of the book and discuss its importance for shedding more light over the debated issue concerning with the relationship between institutions and economic growth. We also provide an outline of the book by describing the contents of each of its eight chapters.

Part I: Economic growth in political perspective

Chp 2: Theory and empirics of Economic growth

In Chapter 2 we offer a comprehensive picture of the literature with a focus of that branch of research that connects economic progress with the functioning of formal and informal institutional arrangements.

Chp 3: Testing the political replacement effect: The econometric model

Based on Leonida et al. (2013), in Chapter 3 we propose an econometric framework to test the political replacement effect that hypothesizes a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship between the degree of political competition and the implementation of growth-enhancing economic policies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The political replacement effect is based on a political calculus of incumbent rulers whose policy decisions are made with the objective to maximize the chances of retaining power.

Chp 4: Economic growth

Based on Leonida et al. (2014), in Chapter 4 we construct an empirical growth model that incorporates the political replacement effect. This allows us to achieve two important objectives, both of them in line with AR's theory. First, we test whether the relationship between political competition and economic growth is non-monotonic. Second, we check whether the impact of political competition on economic growth is exercised by speeding up the conditional convergence dynamics and by increasing investments.

Part II: From economic growth to growth-enhancing engines



Chp 5: Foreign direct investments

Foreign direct investments (FDI) are generally seen as important growth-enhancing engines. FDI are considered as a composite bundle of capital stock, know-how and technology that augment the existing amount of knowledge in the recipient economy. These technological transfers may have

substantial spillover effects for the entire economy by boosting the productivity of all firms. A large literature suggests that FDI flows are mostly directed in those countries where there is a favorable business environment for investors. In Chapter 5 we examine whether AR's theory can be extended to explain the relationship between the political calculus of incumbent rulers, the enactment of pro-investors policy measures and the extent of FDI inflows.

Chp 6: Entrepreneurship

It is widely acknowledged that the market mechanism cannot properly function without the input of individual actors – the entrepreneurs – who bring cutting-edge innovations, recognize the commercial opportunities offered by the market and transform these opportunities into new products that contribute to increase the productivity throughout the entire economy. Entrepreneurs are, therefore, growth-enhancing engines that flourish in a fertile soil made of an appropriate mix of economic and political institutions. Again, our aim in Chapter 6 is to extend AR's theory to evaluate whether and in what circumstances the political calculus of incumbent rulers may lead to the implementation of those policy measures that help creating the appropriate mix of economic and political institutions that are expected to boost entrepreneurship.

Chp 7: Human capital

Individuals vary in both inherited and acquired abilities, but only the latter clearly differ among countries and time periods. Human capital concerns with acquired capacities that are developed through formal and informal education at school and/or at home, and through training, experience and mobility in the labor market. Since the late 1980's, much of the attention of macroeconomists has emphasized the role played by human capital for long-term economic growth. However, incumbent rulers, contingent on the level of democratization in place in their country, may consider investments in education as a potential source of political instability that might erode their chances of retaining power. In Chapter 7 we extend AR's theory to examine whether and to what extent the political calculus of incumbent governing elites impacts on the relationship between individual empowerment through investments in human capital and economic growth.

Chp 8: Conclusions

In Chapter 8 we summarize the results obtained throughout the book and stress the relevance of AR's scientific contribution to understand the determinants of the past and current differences in the wealth of nations.

Cordiali saluti,

Prof. Pietro Navarra